The Market For Justice, The “Litigation Explosion,”
And The “Verdict Bubble”:
A Closer Look at Vanishing Trials
Frederic N. Smalkin1
Frederic N.C. Smalkin2

“A jury consists of twelve persons chosen to
decide who has the better lawyer.”
Robert Frost

Recently, a respected jurist has lamented the declining number of federal jury
trials. Chief Judge William Young of the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts, writing in the Federal Bar Journal,3 pointed out that jury trials in federal
civil cases declined 26% in the decade between 1989 and 1999, which he attributed to
four factors: the district court judiciary’s “loss of focus” on the core function of trying
jury cases; the business community’s loss of interest in jury adjudication (“opting out of
the legal system altogether” in favor of arbitration); Congress’s “marginalizing the
district court judiciary”; and the “Europization [sic] of American Law,” which seems to
refer to the expanding role of administrative adjudication in American law.4
In our view, although Judge Young has correctly observed that the data show a
decline in the number of completed federal civil jury trials,5 and has also given some
explanations for the numbers, he did not give sufficient credit to a major, underlying
issue, which involves the economics of adjudication, beyond the business community’s
“loss of interest” in jury trials. We shall demonstrate that there is a marked increase in
the use of alternative fora, especially arbitration, which is inevitably drawing down the
number of cases that would otherwise be filed, as well as those eventually reaching trial.
Although the decline in trials has come both in trials concluded before judges and juries,
arbitration, as Young recognizes, has a special role in displacing jury trials, as it offers a
more predictable and far less expensive dispute resolution mechanism than is provided by
trial of facts to a randomly selected, broadly representative jury panel.
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We shall also demonstrate that legal history teaches that there has long been
market competition among alternative fora; that fora, as well as litigants, are themselves
motivated by economic considerations that make them more (or less) willing to exercise
jurisdiction; and that dispute resolution will tend, over time, to move toward the most
economically efficient forum. Although increased judicial “activism,” e.g., increased
enthusiasm for resolving cases by summary judgment, has been identified as a major
culprit in the diversion of cases from trial,6 rather little attention seems to have been paid
to the role of jury verdicts – especially high-end “outliers” – as a factor in the shrinking
numbers of trials.

The Numbers
Certainly, as observed by Judge Young, the number of federal civil jury trials7
showed a remarkable decline of more than one-fourth in the decade 1989-99.8 The
authors have brought the numbers up to date, through fiscal year 2002. The decline has
continued, as Table I below clearly demonstrates:
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It is interesting to note from Table I that the decline in completed trials is not confined to
jury trials, but extends to completed trials, both jury and nonjury, which correlate with an
r=0.987.9 The phenomenon of declining trials of both sorts was not addressed by Young,
nor does it follow that the jury trial alone is the victim of the developments he decries in
his article. Certainly, the “Europization” of American law – to take an example of the
factors identified by Young – strikes equally at jury and nonjury trials, as it involves the
utilization of a non-Article III forum to resolve disputes. Statistics reported by the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts do not distinguish between nonjury
trials in which no jury was requested at the outset and those in which a jury demand was
dropped before trial. It has been the experience of the principal author that, because a
jury trial is waived if not requested in the earliest stages of the case (often before the
identity of the assigned judge is known),10 jury demands made early in the case are often
waived at the pre-trial conference or otherwise before the commencement of trial.
Waivers are frequently made because of difficulties in scheduling jury trials in light of
the federal courts’ burgeoning (some would say “crippling”) criminal docket; non-jury
trials are faster to try and easier to schedule. Thus, the number of non-jury trials
completed is not reliably indicative of the parties’ intent at the time of case filing (or
shortly thereafter), when the choice of adjudicative forum is made. It is at that early
9
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choice point that economic considerations associated with the jury trial, such as increased
risk due to damage award variance, increased transactional costs, and the inevitable loss
of confidentiality inherent in a public trial, are most likely determinative and, therefore,
strike equally at all cases in the Article III courts. Thus, we may confine our present
examination to the disappearing federal jury trial.
Where has the litigation gone? One answer might be that the number of trials
completed has declined simply because federal civil trials are getting postponed more
often than in the past. This was investigated by the authors, but was found not to be the
case, as the reported statistics show only a 2.8% increase in median time from filing to
trial in civil cases between 1997 and 2002.11
A second answer is that cases that used to be filed as federal jury cases are going
elsewhere, i.e., they are being filed in state courts or being arbitrated, instead. Because of
the nature of case statistical reporting and the jurisdictional differences among states and
between state and federal courts (including differing programs of court-annexed ADR), it
is impracticable to gather comparable data from all the state courts that serve as
alternative judicial fora to the federal courts to test whether the observed decline in
federal trials has been accompanied by an offsetting increase in comparable state trials.12
It is, however, possible to look to at least one major alternative to the federal trial
– jury or nonjury – and that is the number of arbitrations instituted with the American
Arbitration Association, set forth below in Table II:
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Table II
American Arbitration Association
Total Cases Filed 1992 - 2002
240,000
220,000
200,000
180,000
160,000
140,000
120,000
100,000
80,000
60,000
40,000
20,000
0
CASE FILINGS

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

59,156

63,171

59,424

62,423

72,200

78,769

95,143

140,188

198,491

218,032

230,258

Though, because of the number of dependent variables involved, the data cannot
prove a direct relationship between the steep, steady fall-off in federal civil trials and the
steep, steady increase in arbitrations, a simple comparison of Tables I and II above
certainly shows that while the number of federal trials has been decreasing markedly, the
number of arbitrations has been increasing markedly. It is entirely reasonable to assume
that at least some significant number of cases going to arbitration which would otherwise
have ended up in a federal court are arbitrated principally because the prospect of a jury
trial is a less desirable alternative. Indeed, Judge Young specifically identified as a
culprit in the demise of the jury trial the federal courts’ strong deference to arbitration, as
reflected in federal judges’ “expansive reading” of the Federal Arbitration Act.13 He also
called for amendment of that Act14 to return it to what he sees as its original, limited
purposes: “expansive reading of the Federal Arbitration Act allows the unilateral
imposition of arbitration clauses to trump all sorts of civil rights and consumer protection
legislation.”15
Even if limitations imposed by the nature of the reported data preclude
demonstrating, with robust statistical significance, a direct causal relationship between
declining federal trials and increasing arbitrations, arbitration is, at the very least,
perceived as an attractive alternative forum by both those with disputes, who increasingly
13
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seek it, and at least one responsible member of the federal judiciary, viz., Chief Judge
Young. This observation leads us to suggest that fora can and do compete in the market
for litigation, and that litigation will move, in obedience to ordinary market forces, to the
most economically efficient forum.

A Lesson from Legal History

To a large extent, the history of the development of the legal system of England
from the time of the Norman Conquest through the end of the Eighteenth Century is the
story of evolving notions of jurisdiction (in the sense of a forum’s willingness to entertain
a case). This evolution was powered by the interacting self-interests of fora and litigants.
By the 15th century, the jurisdictions of the two superior national courts of
England, within bounds set by Magna Carta,16 had become fairly well settled by tradition
and usage: King’s Bench had jurisdiction over matters in which the Crown had an
interest, while Common Pleas handled private disputes.17 Until the Crown fell into the
hands of the Tudors at the end of the War of the Roses, the King’s Bench was not a busy
court, as compared to Common Pleas: “Its records filled only a few hundred skins a year,
whereas those of Common Pleas filled a thousand or two.”18 During the 15th century,
both of the superior courts experienced a migration of litigation to alternative fora, i.e.,
the King’s Council and Chancery, where business was taken by “common lawyers, who
resorted to them because of the attraction of their relative informality, the ease with
which defendants could be arrested, and the inquisitorial method of investigation which
bypassed the sheriff and the jury.”19
Their “initial success was perceived as a threat to the business of the common-law
courts.”20 This loss of judicial business principally impacted the King’s Bench, which
reacted by developing “swift process and procedure to vie with that of the Chancery, and
acquired a jurisdiction over most common pleas by a combination of procedural
devices.”21 This did not sit well with Common Pleas, resulting in the “legal disputes of
the later sixteenth century [which] took on the appearance of an internecine struggle for
business between the common-law courts themselves.”22 Although the personnel of
King’s Bench had a personal stake “in furthering this amplification of their jurisdiction,
they were at the same time meeting strong popular demand.”23 The key point for the
present analysis is that “popular demand” was Adam Smith’s invisible hand, quietly
guiding disputes into the forum where they could be resolved at least cost (risk being a
form of cost): “The principal competitors were not the judges or officers [of the courts]
16
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themselves but the litigants and their lawyers, shopping for the most advantageous
forum.”24
King’s Bench, in particular, went to lengths in order to attract more business. In
the 16th Century, King’s Bench “wooed litigants with competitive costs, and sometimes
even lowered its fees in order to increase the overall takings,”25 a universal practice of the
volume seller. Jurisdictional expansion was accomplished by a device labeled the “bill of
Middlesex,” which got around cumbersome, older mechanisms for acquiring jurisdiction
over the defendant’s person by alleging a fictional trespass occurring in the County of
Middlesex, where King’s Bench sat. There would be an allegation that the defendant had
trespassed against the plaintiff in Hendon, and “[i]t mattered not whether the plaintiff or
defendant had ever set foot in Hendon, or even Middlesex.”;26 the fictional trespass
would simply be disregarded, while the dispute proceeded to be resolved on its merits
according to the common law, whether in trespass or in debt or detinue. The net effect of
all this was to increase the business of the King’s Bench by a factor of ten between 1560
and 1640.27 This increase was clearly the result of competitive behavior on the part of
King’s Bench, which “had no monopoly, and … thrived only by satisfying litigants and
the profession at large.”28
Although Common Pleas attempted to meet the competition, it was bound to the
ancient, cumbersome writ procedure for acquiring jurisdiction, and it could not resort to
any fiction as convenient as the Bill of Middlesex. Furthermore, it was not economically
competitive, as “it failed to make substantial reductions in its own scale of costs,
allegedly because the three prothonotaries could never reach agreement on any specific
proposal for the cuts.”29 The Common Pleas did not see an overall diminution in its
caseload, as there was an overall increase in litigation during this period. Common Pleas’
bar was ten times larger than that of King’s Bench, and it included a substantial number
of attorneys who practiced throughout the country, rather than simply at Westminster.30
Thus, “the business of the Common Pleas increased considerably during the sixteenth and
early seventeenth centuries, albeit at a slower rate than that of the King’s Bench.”31
Interestingly, the end of the King’s Bench-Common Pleas competition was
accomplished both by legislation in 1661 designed to cut back on King’s Bench’s
jurisdictional fictions32 and by Common Pleas’ own adoption of a jurisdiction-enhancing
fiction in 1675.33
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Why did these courts compete with each other for business in the first place
throughout the 16th and 17th centuries? Other than professional pride and prejudice, the
most compelling motivation was the compensation of judges and other court officers. It
was not until much later that the concept of English judicial and quasi-judicial office as a
property right to be held in freehold,34 capable of being bought and sold, died out;
remuneration of the judge in the form of fees35 was not replaced by a stated annual salary
until 1826.36 In the period of intense jurisdictional competition discussed above, put
simply, more litigation meant more money lining the judicial robe. The courts were
acting, in large part, out of selfish economic considerations when establishing their
jurisdictions and setting their procedures.37
Interestingly, friction between the arbitral forum itself and the common law courts
from economic competition can be traced back to the same period of inter-judicial
competition addressed above. The great legal historian and Chancellor Lord Campbell
observed:
There was no disguising the fact that, as formerly, the emoluments of the Judges depended
mainly, or almost entirely, upon fees, and as they had no fixed salaries, there was great
competition to get as much as possible of litigation into Westminster Hall for the division of
the spoil * * * And they had great jealousy of arbitrations whereby Westminster Hall was
robbed of those cases which came not into Kings Bench, nor the Common Pleas, nor the
Exchequer. Therefore they said that the courts ought not to be ousted of their jurisdiction, and
that it was contrary to the policy of the law to do so. That really grew up only subsequently to
the time of Lord Coke, and a saying of his was the foundation of the doctrine.38

The Jury’s In

The archetypal Anglo-American dispute resolution mechanism is, of course, the
trial of issues of fact before the jury.39 Juries in English law predate the Norman
Conquest. Over many centuries, and for a number of reasons, the jury’s character
underwent a remarkable change. With small license, the modern jury can conveniently
be thought of as having evolved markedly from its ancestor, a group of locals essentially
called as witnesses and sworn to speak the true facts as they knew them to the King’s
justices, as those justices came to the shires from the seat of government to extend the
King’s writ and to exercise his judicial power. During the 14th Century, the jury
gradually was transformed into a more neutral body of fact-finders, who were not
expected to have first-hand knowledge of the disputants or their dispute. Judges
34
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exercised tremendous control over juries, and could even attaint them for a false
verdict.40 Except for this element of judicial control, the modern American jury has not
changed much its basic role in the legal process from its Tudor ancestor to the present,
though, as will be shown, it has changed markedly in its composition and – at least in
England – its utilization.
The English civil jury, ancestor of America’s, has fallen into almost complete
desuetude, with what, in historical perspective, has been remarkable swiftness. It started
with the enactment of the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854,41 enabling the parties to
consent to fact-finding by the judge, as “[a]ll the experience suggested that judges were
more likely to understand the factual issues than laymen, and were as competent to assess
evidence.”42 The decline was not only swift, it was broad: “In the course of the twentieth
century, however, the alternative of jury trial more or less disappeared. The very
existence of an option made the decision to ask for a jury suspicious: it suggested the
hope of confusion in a weak case, or the expectation of exorbitant damages in cases
involving distressing details or high feelings … Since 1933 parties have been allowed
juries only with leave of court, except in cases of libel and a few other matters; and the
courts have indicated their unwillingness to give such leave.”43 These developments are
all the more remarkable because they took place without legislation, by the common
consent of the participants in the English public adjudication market, primarily English
lawyers (who have been historically precluded from taking cases on a contingent fee
basis). In short, the market for civil jury trials in England simply dried up.
American federal courts, of course, do not enjoy the ability of their English
cousins simply to dispense with the civil jury as unreliable or outmoded. The Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution guarantees most federal civil litigants44 a jury trial when
40
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pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. section 1603(b). For an interesting discussion of the constitutionality of the
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the enormous sum of $20.00 is in controversy,45 and many state constitutions provide
similar guarantees.
The jury of the Seventh Amendment’s Age of Enlightenment and the modern civil
trial jury are, however, two very different institutions. Again, history is instructive.
Alexis de Tocqueville praised the common-law jury of his age, calling it “as
direct and extreme consequence of the sovereignty of the people as universal suffrage.”46
Of course, it is well known that suffrage in America at the time of de Tocqueville was far
from universal; indeed, it was not until much later that traditionally excluded groups
(women of all races and African-Americans) gained the right to vote.47 And what of
juries? Were they, in de Tocqueville’s day, as far from representative of the general
population as was the electorate? Surprisingly, at least in the federal courts, they were,
and, more surprisingly, they remained so until well into the latter half of the 20th Century.
Indeed, it has been said that “Eighteenth-century juries were…`the Rotarians of their
day.’”48
The procedure for assembling a jury venire in the federal district courts was not
made uniform throughout the country until enactment of the Jury Selection and Service
Act of 1968.49 Before that Act, most federal juries were selected by the “key man”50
system. The chief judge of the District selected a “key man” who would assemble a
venire for a term of court, calling upon individuals personally known or recommended to
him who would make “good” jurors, in his estimation. From this venire, the petit juries
were empanelled at trial, after voir dire conducted by the trial judge. As the legislative
history of the 1968 Act so eloquently understated it, “Often the [key man] system results
in under representation of craftsmen, service workers, and laborers as compared with the
professional and managerial classes.”51 In fact, the federal trial jury known to the
previous generation of lawyers was a select jury.

immunity from jury trial given foreign states, see, In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana on
October 31, 1994, 96 F.3d 932, 945-47 (7th Cir. 1996).
45
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obligation to give civil litigants a jury trial. The Seventh Amendment’s guarantee of a civil jury trial has
historically been viewed as not binding on the States, see, Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 (1876),
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Surprisingly little is said in general English legal history texts about the method of
jury selection at common law.52 We do know, however, that sheriffs of the counties
played the key role in jury selection. For example, in the course of discussing the general
state of political and legal corruption in the 15th Century, one distinguished scholar noted,
“[T]he sheriffs were the tools of greater men, and, through their power over juries, the
law of the country was at their mercy.”53 The so-called “gentleman jury,” impaneled by
the sheriff for important cases, was limited by law to gentlemen of what for the time was
substantial wealth (“men of quality”) and, in some cases, required a venire to be
assembled from those “legally entitled to be called esquire, or a person of high decree
[sic], such as a banker, merchant, or the head of a dwelling rated at not less than onehundred pounds in a town of 20,000 or fifty pounds elsewhere.”54
The “gentleman jury,” moreover, was only one type of jury, and none of the
others was very different in terms of its lack of inclusivity:
Four types of special juries existed in common law England. The first type, the
gentleman jury, consisted of men of high social or economic status. The second type, the
struck jury, was selected upon the demand of either party and consisted of principal
landowners selected from a list of forty-eight names. The third type, the professional
jury, had members who possessed special knowledge or expertise. The fourth and most
unique type, the party jury, attempted to ensure a foreign defendant of fairness by
encompassing only individuals who were the same race, sex, or origin as the defendant.55

Of course, the “key man” system utilized in federal practice until the late 1960s
did not differ much in terms of its product from the subjective selection processes noted
above and no doubt familiar to those who drafted the Seventh Amendment.56 And the
practice was not much different in most state courts, select juries yielding only over time
to those chosen, as today, from the populace at large (or some segment thereof, such as
registered voters), more-or-less at random.57
The present, randomly-selected and
minimally qualified (i.e., meeting only criteria such as having a driver’s license or being
registered to vote) jury may be labeled the “modern” jury.

Judicial Economics

52

For example, there is no discussion of the mechanics of jury selection in the works of Baker or Kier cited
in footnotes 17 and 34, supra.
53
J.E.A. Jolliffe, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 417 (4th ed. 1961).
54
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Complex Civil Litigation, 3 SUFFOLK J. OF TRIAL AND APPELLATE ADVOCACY 1, 9 (1998).
55
Id. at 8-9.
56
U.S. CONST. amend. VII (establishing the right to jury trial in federal actions at law with $20 or more in
controversy).
57
Bertelsen, supra note 54, at 9-13.
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Of course, judges are no longer mulcted in fees (or, one hopes, in bribes),58 but
are paid a stated salary, no matter how much or how little judicial business comes before
them. Thus, they certainly no longer have any financial motive to increase the judicial
business of the courts on which they serve; rather, if there is too much judicial business,
there may be an incentive to decrease it.59 While this lends itself readily to the
suggestion that judges are selfishly abandoning their duties, for example, by unjustifiably
granting defendants’ motions for summary judgment,60 an examination of their actions
alone is misdirected, though understandable; there is a natural tendency to assign
responsibility for the courts’ business to those who run them, i.e., the federal judges.
However, it is not a lack of judges’ services (supply) that is shifting the market to ADR.
In fact, the shortfall is in demand for the ultimate exercise of judicial authority – the trial
– which can spring only from the population of litigants.
Much has been written addressing the rising costs of litigation, most of which
focuses on the cost and delay associated with a modern jury trial of the facts.61 Time has
always been equated with money, as the old saying bears witnesses, and the delay and
added work associated with the jury trial burden both sides. For example, the hiring of
jury consultants to help tailor the jury panel, through peremptory challenges, to one
perceived as more predisposed to the consultant’s client has become popular.62 Why
would a litigant add to the cost of litigation as it approaches trial and faces mounting
expenditures? The answer lies in the fact and the perception of risk in today’s jury
system. We assume this has not been previously addressed much in depth because some
of the relevant economic literature is fairly recent, and the factors involved are not
explicit costs in classic economic theory.
As history demonstrates, there is a market in dispute resolution, and there is no
reason to think it behaves any differently than other markets. In today’s adjudication
market, a driving force is undoubtedly the implicit cost of the jury – the risk that comes
from the jury’s uncertainty of outcome. Modern market theory, well established and

58

See Baker, supra note 17, at 112 (discussing Bacon’s and Macclesfield’s dismissals as Chancellor on
account of “accepting ‘presents’”).
59
A prominent legal scholar has recently taken the federal judiciary to task for overzealous grants of
(mostly defendants’) motions for summary judgment, in part because some judges tend to use summary
judgment as a docket-clearing tool (i.e., granting summary judgment motions in close cases that probably
ought to go to trial) to cope with a “litigation explosion” that is, to Miller, more imagined than real: “A
cynic might say, therefore, that ‘getting it right’ no longer is near the top of the priority list, indeed, it may
well rank below ‘getting it over with’”. See, A. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the ‘Litigation
Explosion,’ ‘Liability Crisis,’ and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial
Commitments? 78 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 982, 1003 (June, 2003).
60
Id.
61
For example, former Chief Justice Warren E. Burger called the judicial system “too costly, too painful,
too destructive, and too inefficient for a truly civilized society” in a speech to the American Bar
Association (Feb. 12, 1984). Mid-Year Meeting of the American Bar Association, 52 U.S.L.W. 2471
(1984).
62
“By the mid-1990s, the jury consulting business was estimated to have passed $200 million in annual
revenues, mostly catering to lawyers handling civil cases….” Walter K. Olson, Courting Stupidity: Why
Smart Lawyers Pick Dumb Juries,” REASON 1.03 at 25 (January 2003).

12

accepted in the field of economics, tells us that bearing risk63 is work, just like any other,
and is compensated as such. Merging the mathematics of probability with economics, a
theory has emerged that can be applied to the instant situation.
Plaintiffs’ lawyers will inevitably seek to maximize fees, taking advantage of the
so-called “American rule” that tolerates contingency fees. This is a prime example of
risk and reward: the higher the risk, the higher must be the offsetting reward. Once
assessed, risk can be divided into two kinds, “systemic” and “non-systemic.” These
categories of risk can be applied to the judicial system if we consider the payoff from a
case – whether it be an award or the avoidance thereof – as a sort of legal “security.”
The behavior of the securities market has been the subject of considerable study.
In that market, non-systemic risk describes uncertainties associated with a particular
security. In law, non-systemic risk would be the unknowns of an individual case, such as
a client’s information not divulged to counsel or uncertainty of outcome. (Indeed, a
certain amount of risk is necessary to have a live case or controversy, the risk being
uncertainty about the applicable law or the facts.) In theory, non-systemic risk can be
minimized, for example by diversification. Thus, a plaintiff’s lawyer is likely to take, on
a contingency basis, a range of cases with unknown probabilities of favorable outcomes,
to maximize her potential to make a profit and limit losses.
In contrast, systemic risk applies to variables that affect multiple securities and
those securities’ collective response. Having factored out non-systemic risk, evaluating
systemic risk allows careful investors to choose precisely the amount of risk they wish to
bear and, accordingly, the compensation they wish to receive. Investing is again
illustrative, as in the simple case of bonds versus stocks. An investor with a long time
horizon would choose a diversified portfolio of stocks, which are far riskier, but bring
higher reward. Nearing retirement, the investor would move her money into bonds,
giving up remuneration, but lowering her risk. This phenomenon is reflected in the
practice of law; it is generally true that those who practice in the less predictable areas of
the law (such as plaintiff’s tort work) ask an accordingly higher compensation, usually in
the form of a contingency fee that can run into the millions, as opposed to an hourly fee
or “value billing.” But currently, salient legal risk depends less on the merits or
circumstances of an individual case, or even its general type, than on the forum that
entertains it. If we think of the courts as stocks, and ADR as bonds, the modern jury
brings systemic risk – especially from high-end outlier verdicts – to the courts. Hence,
the careful investor, in our case, the prudent lawyer, can maximize gains or – as many
would see it – minimize losses by choosing one dispute resolution mechanism or the
other.
In other words, the increasing variability of jury awards – especially the “outlier”
verdicts at the upper extreme – makes the system economically inefficient, and this
inefficiency creates excess profits and costs. Returning to our earlier question, one such
cost is the fee of the jury consultant, who is hired in an attempt to reduce the variance
introduced by the jury. The money that a defendant’s jury consultant is paid can be
63
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thought of as a slice of the “pure profit pie” that the plaintiff’s lawyer might receive, were
the consultants not able to advise their client to select a jury that minimizes the risk of an
outlier verdict.
As mentioned above, there is evidence that, at bottom, it was the self-interest of
litigants and their attorneys that dictated forum choice in the Tudor through Stuart
periods.64 Self-interest, as a basic motivator of human behavior, of course, cannot be
expected to have disappeared or diminished appreciably in the few hundred years since
the jurisdictional wars of the English courts came to an end. If a litigant has the power to
maneuver the resolution of a dispute into a forum perceived as more advantageous to him
– whether from the standpoint of exposure to unpredictable high outlier verdicts, speed
and cost of adjudication, or other factors – both common sense and microeconomic
theory65 suggest that he will do so,66 as, for example, by inserting a binding arbitration
clause or other sort of forum selection clause (e.g., home-state federal court only) in a
contract. And, of course, those same fundamental forces suggest that, if both sides
perceive the advantage of one forum over another, they will mutually agree upon it, even
if no agreement on dispute resolution was reached ex ante. Such perceptions have
various roots and take various forms. For example, defense lawyers quite naturally and
correctly perceive that a judge is less likely to award a huge amount of damages
(especially for non-economic injury or punitive damages) than a jury (yet, there are data
showing that plaintiffs have a higher mean success rate in a number of categories of cases
(in terms of win/loss, not of damage award size) when a judge is the fact-finder).67 One
should note, thought, that alternative dispute resolution does not always (or necessarily)
benefit the defendant alone. For example, the speed and low cost with which arbitration
can settle a dispute may work in favor of the plaintiff’s attorney who handles a large
volume of cases and/or is underwriting costs for an impecunious clientele. Although
there are arguably many possible costs and benefits that can steer either side towards a
particular forum, economic theory (in particular, the Coase Theorem) states that, in the
long run, actors in a market will seek efficiency by devising a way to divide the surplus
created by adding value or, as in our case, eliminating waste.68 Thus, so long as both
sides perceive that they can get “justice,” if it can be had at a lower cost, the disputeresolution process will inevitably migrate to the less expensive alternative.
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The Jury’s Out

Of course, despite popular sentiment, there is not universal agreement that very
high outlier verdicts or even a “litigation explosion” actually exist to a significant extent.
In fact, Professor Arthur Miller, in an article cited earlier in this work,69 rests a large part
of his argument against the overzealous grant of summary judgment on his perception
that there has been no “litigation explosion.”70 He argues that, overall, the number of
cases filed is not growing disproportionately to the population. He also downplays a
perceived rising tide in jury damage awards: “[A] RAND Institute of Civil Justice study
finding that mean jury verdicts increased in Cook County and San Francisco…found that
the median jury verdict figures, when certain procedural changes in San Francisco were
accounted for, actually remained ‘strikingly stable’ over the twenty-five-year period.”
(Emphasis in original)71 An increase, however, in the mean – but not the median – most
likely reflects an increasing incidence of high-end outlying verdicts. That is, it is
reasonable to conclude that, as the high-end awards move higher, the variance in awards
– and therefore risk – increases, because there is no reason to believe that, over the span
of time studied, the bulk of verdicts became more concentrated around the median. Even
those who might doubt that the empirical evidence for variance substantiates perceptions
of variance adduced by anecdotal evidence do not doubt the reality of the perceptions
themselves and their effect on the vanishing jury trial.72
In short, drastic unpredictability inheres in the power of the jury (above and
beyond its basic determination of a verdict on liability – a process which itself has come
under academic scrutiny73 ) to fix damage awards, as it sees fit, with limited review, and
with reversal only in the most egregious cases, and even then, not often. The jury can be
seen as a sort of “black box” into which various versions of the facts are dumped and
from which an unpredictable answer rolls out. Certainly, no one suggests that the award
of damages should be taken out of the jury’s province altogether, or that there is a need
radically to overhaul theories underlying damage awards. Indeed, scholars have shown
that punitive damages are an efficient means to achieve proper deterrence.74 But
excessive damage awards have an inefficient over-deterrent effect.75 More importantly,
the simple possibility of excessive damages – whether compensatory or punitive – raises
costs for litigants across the board and affects the dynamics of settlement. This
phenomenon was noted in a recent law review article, in terms of its effect on “repeat
player” defendants: “[F]or insurance companies and other repeat litigants, a major goal
69
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(if not the major goal) in pretrial negotiations must be to avoid those huge verdicts that
inflate the mean awards.”76 Economists might deem this whole situation, instead of a
“litigation explosion,” a “verdict bubble.”
Legal economists have advanced numerous theories in an attempt to arrive at an
efficient calculation of damages, concentrating on punitive damages, which, of course,
are purely non-economic damages, i.e., are not premised upon any loss to the plaintiff
reducible to dollars.77 One impediment to rationalizing the process is that jurors often
encounter difficulty comprehending and implementing a judge’s instructions.78 A recent
study has shown that even when presented with a model (e.g., the Polinsky-Shavell
model) for determining punitive damages, jurors will arrive at “incorrect” determinations,
i.e., those that are not efficient.79 Indeed, other research drawing on psychology has
shown that factors such as so-called “benchmarks,” subconsciously set in the jurors’
minds by external sources such as the media, can be just as determinative as the factors
that jurors “should” weigh to achieve an efficient outcome.80 What is most intriguing,
and perhaps highly significant, is that jurors’ abilities to correctly weigh the factors that
determine efficient damages seem to vary directly with demographic variables.81 The
data suggest that jury awards are not only positively correlated to the demographic
makeup of the jury, but also to other, broader socioeconomic factors, such as the poverty
rate in the community from which the venire is drawn.82 Factor in group dynamics that
actually tend to increase the variability of jury awards83 with random, cross-sectional jury
selection, and the conclusion is inevitable that variability, risk, and costs all must be
higher now than in the days of the select jury.84
The unpredictability and unreliability of modern jury discretion in fixing punitive
damages has been well-documented, as discussed above.85 One would certainly expect
the same sort of unpredictability and unreliability to inhere in an average jury’s ability to
fix compensatory damages, particularly in light of the fact that jurors’ accuracy in
determining punitive awards is directly correlated to their socioeconomic and educational
background,86 a factor that would seem to figure equally in a compensatory damage
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calculation, especially for non-economic damages, such as pain and suffering. In such
cases, juror sympathy or empathy can be played upon by a skillful plaintiff’s attorney like
Perlman plays a fine Stradivarius. We may safely speculate that research would show a
general migration by defendants toward courts whose juries are drawn from the higher
socioeconomic strata. Indeed, removal of cases from urban state courts to federal courts
(with venires drawn from suburban and rural areas as well as from the urban area) has
been noted anecdotallyas a favored tactic of the defense , as has avoidance of certain rural
or depressed counties that are “plaintiff-friendly” in terms of high-end verdicts.87 In
short, the social forces that brought about the demise of the select jury have injected an
element of increased risk (flowing form unpredictability and variability at the highest
end) that, at least in the perception of some of the users, renders the system inefficient.
Obviously, there are potentially as many factors that could account for variance in
verdicts among juries hearing similar cases as there are factual differences among cases,
and we do not mean to suggest that the composition of the jury is the sole determinant of
variance and unpredictability, but it is nonetheless a very important one that must be
taken into account in explaining the lamented disappearance of the jury trial.
To find anecdotal evidence that the verdict bubble is real and is not a
geographically isolated phenomenon, one need go no further than a major city’s
classified telephone directory. In one such East Coast directory, one finds advertisements
for lawyers who have “won verdicts and settled cases involving millions of dollars...$3.3
MILLION awarded for negligent death...$2.4 MILLION awarded...$3.35 MILLION
awarded...$5 MILLION awarded...”88 A few pages later is an ad for a lawyer who claims
damage awards won in amounts of $10,250,000, $4,100,000, $7,390,000, and
$12,000,000, and who boasts that “juries just love him.”89 The perception of huge jury
awards as normative – based perhaps on a factor as inherently unpredictable as a jury’s
“love” for a particularly personable lawyer – is thusly formed.
As the movie Wall Street’s fictional tycoon Richard Gekko noted, “Information is
the most valuable commodity I know of.”90 This is true because it is information that
drives markets to efficiency, or inefficiency. While Miller notes, correctly, that “jury
awards considered excessively high often are reduced by the court or by the parties
themselves by way of settlement, or are reversed altogether on appeal[,]”91 the damage of
unpredictable variance is done as soon as the verdict is returned. Because these large
awards form subliminal benchmarks92 for future jurors – and the initial verdict is sure to
be the front page, while its reduction, if it comes, will get ½ column inch on page 23 –
the verdict bubble is a self-reinforcing phenomenon. It matters not what the final
outcomes of individual cases are, because the mere public perception of rising jury
awards adds momentum to the same; this creates a trickle-down effect into settlements.
If plaintiffs perceive even the slightest chance of receiving a very large verdict, the power
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of numbers and expected returns93 substantially raises their leverage in demanding a
settlement.94 In this way, the jury’s influence today extends beyond its immediate
domain and raises costs for litigants across the board, above the level that represents
efficiency.

The Verdict

Given sufficient information, markets will not tolerate inefficiencies. The modern
jury trial entails such an inefficiency. To escape the real and perceived costs of the
federal jury trial, litigants are flocking to arbitration and other forms of ADR.95 The
expectation is that, there, plaintiffs will find the justice they seek, and defendants will be
more likely to have their “punishment fit the crime,” thereby avoiding the “deep-pocket”
phenomenon96 and optimizing the risk vs. benefit for both sides.
The inescapable fact is that, unless prohibited from doing so, disputants will do as
they please. This is not to say that traditional trials will disappear. But there are some
often-overlooked aspects to the decline in tried cases that argue for again making the
courts more attractive to litigants. Most importantly, as dispute resolution moves out of
the courts, society is necessarily deprived of a number of cases that could advance our
body of law by adding new precedents. And, as any lawyer knows, trials as learning
opportunities for junior members of the bar are increasingly rare. Many “litigators” have
garnered most of their experience at depositions or in mock proceedings, thus
diminishing the body of experiential learning, not to mention “war stories,” which
themselves play an important educational role.
We have demonstrated that, like any market, the adjudication market is subject to
forces beyond the control of any single actor, but the inputs of every actor undoubtedly
influence the market. Accordingly, those who think the federal courts should retain a
significant part of the adjudication market should seriously consider making those courts
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more attractive. This requires the difficult step of questioning whether the modern jury,
as an exercise in pure democracy, is the appropriate dispute-resolver for all cases,
especially complex or otherwise difficult ones. Commentators have questioned whether,
for example, “it [is] fair to ask a millworker, school custodian, receptionist, plumber,
nurse’s aid [sic], housewife, and others possessing no expertise in economics or
accounting, to render an accurate verdict based on average variable cost determinations
and consequences of inventory accounting?”97 The question might just as well have
been put as to whether it makes sense to do so, a question that has been answered no in
England and most other industrialized nations.98 One answer is to return, at least in
complex commercial cases,99 to a more select jury than the “modern” one.100 Although,
to be sure, any return to greater selectivity in jury venire selection according to
educational achievement or particular expertise implicates sensitive social and, perhaps,
constitutional questions,101 it certainly has been suggested in the literature.102 If such a
course – even given adequate safeguards against intentional, invidious discrimination – is
too politically unpalatable to be implemented, lesser measures to influence the
sophistication of the venire can surely be undertaken without objection, e.g.,
discontinuation of the practice of granting automatic (whether de jure or de facto)
exemptions to classes of individuals such as proprietors of businesses, doctors, and the
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like.103 While the authors have not found any reported data, we seriously doubt that
many executive officers of Fortune 500 companies are empanelled in jury venires, let
alone actually serve as trial jurors.104
The bottom line is simply this: Serious consideration should be given to offering
appropriate alternatives to the current jury selection process in appropriate cases if the
federal courts are to continue to present a viable choice for those shopping for dispute
resolution. Otherwise, one can reasonably expect that the decline in cases reaching trial –
in favor of other forms of dispute resolution – can, on the basis of elemental market
forces, be expected to continue at its present, fairly steady rate to some irreducible
minimum, perhaps consisting mostly of suits involving irrational litigants105or those with
nothing to lose by “rolling the dice.” The question is whether resistance to jury reform
can be overcome by those in the position – and with the determination – to at least
experiment with meaningful change.
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ABSTRACT

This article takes a fresh look at the increasingly discussed topic of the
scarcity of civil cases reaching trial in the Article III system. The number of
cases tried declined by more than one-fourth in the decade from 1989-1999,
and the decline continued at about the same rate to the end of the latest year
for which statistics are available, 2002, while ADR (particularly arbitrations)
skyrocketed.
The authors examine the history of competing English courts
(particularly Common Pleas and King’s Bench) for signs that, in fact, market
competition can arise among dispute-resolving bodies. They also apply
economic analysis to the present flight from jury trials to ADR, examining
the role of jury verdicts in the economics of forum choice, especially as
relates to the “verdict bubble,” i.e., the perception engendered by reports of
high-end verdicts.
The authors conclude by suggesting that the federal courts might
increase the attractiveness of the jury trial option by offering the possibility
of a “select” jury in the appropriate case, with, for example, a venire
specially qualified by education or experience in complex or technical cases,
for which there is historical precedent.
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